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Abstract
We consider an environment where two education institutions com-
pete by selecting the proportion of their funding devoted to teaching
and research and the criteria for admission for their students, and
where students choose whether and where to attend university. We
study the relationship between the cost incurred by students for at-
tending a university located away from their home town and the equi-
librium con…guration that emerges in the game played by the uni-
versities. Symmetric equilibria, where universities choose the same
admission standard, only exist when the mobility cost is high; when
the mobility cost is very low, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
For intermediate values of the mobility cost, only asymmetric equilib-
ria may exist; the …nal section of the paper provides an example where
asymmetric equilibria do indeed exist for a plausible and robust set of
parameters.
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1 Introduction
There are surprisingly few theoretical studies devoted to the university sys-
tem, despite its quantitative and qualitative importance, and researchers’
direct interest in it. In this paper, we propose a theoretical model of compe-
tition between universities. A sound understanding of this topic is important
both as a possible way to explain the considerably di¤erent manners in which
the sector is organised in di¤erent countries, and as an aid to design policies
aimed at improving the performance of the sector.
There are several basic features that set the university sector apart from
other, better studied, industries. Firstly, the higher education market does
not typically clear in the usual sense: notwithstanding the potential existence
of a market price for university education, most systems allocate places to
students by administrative rationing. Secondly, the performance of a uni-
versity (measured along the dimension of the quality of the teaching pro-
vided) depends positively on the ability of its own students: universities use
a customer-input technology (Rothschild and White 1995).1 Thirdly, the
pro…t maximising behaviour typically assumed for large commercial organi-
sations,2 as well as for some not-for-pro…t private institutions,3 is not likely
to be a good proxy for the objective function of individual universities. The
model of this paper captures all three of these features: universities set an
admission standard, and their performance depends positively on the ability
of their students. With regard to their objective function, we choose a very
general formulation, and can therefore cover a potentially large range of situ-
ations: we assume that the universities aim at maximising a measure of their
prestige, which, in turn, we take to be positively a¤ected by the quantity
1See Clotfelter (1999) and Winston (1995) for a detailed discussion of the speci…c
characteristics of the higher education sector.
2Indeed much theoretical research shows how actions and decisions which would, su-
per…cially, appear to indicate that a commercial organisation is not maximising its pro…t,
are in fact, once pro…t is properly de…ned and strategic interactions with another agents
taken fully into account, part of a pro…t maximising plan (Tirole 1988).
3For example, Dranove and White (1994) o¤er theoretical arguments, based on the
consequences of plausible assumptions on the objective functions of the relevant decision
makers inside institutions, suggesting that not-for-pro…t private hospitals do in fact ulti-
mately behave as if they maximised pro…t.
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and quality of the students enrolled, and by the success of the university’s
research activities.
The interaction between students and universities is schematically mod-
elled as follows: universities set admissions standards, and those students
who qualify for admission choose whether to attend university or not; in
addition, if a student achieves the admission standard at more than one uni-
versity, she chooses which university to attend. To make this choice, students
take into account the (current) travel and mobility costs (given by the mon-
etary cost of travel and relocation, by the utility costs of being away from
family and friends, and so on), and the (future) labour market income which
can be obtained after attending a given university.
We study the game between two ex-ante identical universities. Our main
contribution is the characterisation of the relationship between the level of
the mobility costs, and the equilibrium con…guration. Our results can be
summarised as follows.
² If the mobility cost is high, then the equilibrium is symmetric: uni-
versities are ex-post, as well as ex-ante, identical. They set the same
admission standard, admit the same number of students, and spend
the same amount on research.
² At lower levels of the mobility cost, if an equilibrium exists, it must
be asymmetric: one university becomes an élite institution: it sets a
higher standard and enrols the best students, while the other sets lower
admission standards.
² At lower still mobility cost, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.4
We believe that our model, though highly stylised, captures appropriately
the role of mobility cost in shaping the relationship between institutions
within the university sector. For example, the existence of students grants
(or cheap loans) and abundant and convenient university accommodation
seems likely to make the mobility cost in the UK lower than in the rest of
4Del Rey (2000) develops a model related to ours. She obtains symmetric equilibria.
Her analysis therefore corresponds to the case of high mobility cost in our model.
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Europe, enabling an institution to view the entire nation as a potential source
of students. Our analysis suggests that the equilibrium con…guration which
emerges in this case is “hierarchical”, with one institution requiring higher
standards than the other, and both institutions recruiting from the entire
population: this tallies with the UK situation. In continental Europe, by
contrast, the institutions set similar standards and, by and large, students
attend their local university.5 In the US, one may argue that the bene…t of
attending a leading institution overcomes the mobility cost only for brighter
students (and/or that the latter have a lower mobility cost). Therefore, our
model is consistent with the evidence of an increase in the strati…cation of the
students population, with leading institutions recruiting an ever increasing
number of the brightest students from the whole country, while less bright
students attending their local college (see Cook and Frank, 1993).6
We present a general model in section 2: this details the behaviour of
the universities (subsection 2.1) and of the students (subsection 2.2). In
Section 3 we show that if a pure strategy equilibrium exists, then it must
be asymmetric, for the mobility cost below a certain threshold. In Section 4
we provide an example with speci…c functional forms, which shows that such
equilibria do in fact exist. Section 5 concludes.
5This is a point clearly deserving careful empirical investigation: some preliminary
comparison between Italy and England would however support it, suggesting that around
8% of English students live at home while studying for a university degree, when the
corresponding proportion is about 67% for Italy; dividing each nation in 9 regions, in
England, 18% of students attend a university in the same region, whereas in Italy, at least
80% do (Naylor and Smith, 2001).
6Riesman (1998) describes the evolution of the American higher education market
and raises the concern that competition among institutions for students will lead to lower
academic standards and marginal di¤erentiation among universities. Hoxby (1997) studies
the e¤ects of the increased competition experienced by the American higher education from
1940 to the present on college prices and quality. She …nds empirical evidence that greater
competition led to an increase in the average quality and tuition fees as well as in product
di¤erentiation between universities. Recently Epple et al (2001) …nd empirical evidence
of a hierarchical strati…cation of US universities.
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2 The model
2.1 The universities.
We consider an environment where a large population of potential students
is evenly distributed in two towns, A and B; in both towns the number of
students is normalised to 1. In each town there is a university which provides
education services to the students it enrols.
We assume that universities are run by a bureaucracy, or management,
who are interested in the prestige of their institution. Prestige, of course, is
a rather vague term, and we let it be given here by a function with three
arguments: (i) the number of students, n, (ii) the average ability of the
student body, £, and (iii) the expenditure on research, R. Formally, we
write the objective function of an institution as
W (n; R;£) : (1)
To justify (1), we begin by noting that, clearly, other things equal, a large
institution is more prestigious than a smaller one, because, for example, it
is more visible in the local community, it features more often in the national
press, and so on. Therefore, other things equal, an increase in the number of
students improves the value of the objective function of a university. If the
quantity of students a¤ects the prestige of a university, so does their quality:
to the extent that better students achieve more prestigious social positions,
this also enhances the prestige of that institutions.7 It is also the case that
brighter students earn more in the labour market, and this improves the
university’s long-term potential for …nancial donations and bequests: if, on
average, alumni donate or bequeath a proportion of their income to their
alma mater, then an increase in the total earnings of an institution’s grad-
uates generates a corresponding increase in that institution’s potential for
7That the success of an institutions’ alumni matters is exempli…ed in the way university
magazines and web pages boast of the success and achievement of their graduates. Another
example is given by a typical career progression for the heads of UK institutions: several
move from a smaller university, to a larger one, and then to head an Oxbridge college,
very small but extremely prestigious institutions. This suggest that size is not all that
matters.
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donations from alumni. Finally, in addition to teaching, universities do re-
search; the prestige of an institution is clearly a¤ected by the quality of its
research. To the extent that expenditure on research increases the quality of
research, for example, because it allows institutions to recruit and to retain
better researchers, to purchase more expensive equipment, and so on, then,
ceteris paribus, an institution prefers to spend more on research. Note also
thatR could be re-interpreted as expenditure on improving the quality of ed-
ucation: after paying for basic tuition, the university can use the what is left
to improve the quality of research (which increases prestige) or the quality of
education (which increases the earnings of the alumni). In view of this dis-
cussion, the …rst partial derivatives ofW in (1) are all strictly positive. With
regard to the second derivative, we assume that Wnn(¢);WRR(¢);W££(¢) < 0,
where subscripts denotes partial derivatives, and that the second cross deriv-
atives are su¢ciently small so that the relevant second order conditions are
satis…ed. This implies that W (¢) is approximately separable.
We assume that each university is assigned the same …xed budget, b > 0,
by the government agency in charge of the higher education system: univer-
sities are unable to a¤ect their revenues, and, in particular, they are not free
to choose what students are charged in fees. This is a reasonable approxi-
mation of the current practice in most European countries; moreover, from
a conceptual point of view, it allows us to analyse the decisions concerning
expenditure on research and academic standards separately from decisions
about raising revenues. In this setting, each university chooses the required
standard necessary to be accepted as a student.8 We denote by xi, i = A;B,
this standard and let it vary in the subset of the real line: xi 2 X µ IR,
i = A;B. This implies that only students who reach at least standard xi
are accepted at institution i. On the …nancial side, we assume that teaching
n > 0 students carries a cost of c (n), naturally with c0 (n) > 0; it is also
convenient to assume c00(n) > 0, at least in the relevant range, and that
limn!1 c0 (n) = +1.
8We do not model explicitly the way in which the admission process operates. We can,
however think of university requiring students to have a minimum grade at the school they
attend before entering university, or setting a specialist pre-entry exam.
5
2.2 The students
In addition to their location, students, the potential “customers” of the two
institutions, are di¤erentiated according to their ability. This is denoted
by µ 2 [0; 1] (an innocuous normalisation). In each town, the students’
distribution by ability is F (µ), with F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and density
f (µ) = F 0 (µ). We also assume that f 0 (x) is bounded from above by a
su¢ciently large (positive) number, again to ensure that the second order
conditions are satis…ed.
We assume that there is a functional relationship linking the admission
standard set by a university, x, and the lowest ability student that can be
accepted as a student, µ. Let Ã (x) be this function, so that µ = Ã (x). It
is natural to assume that there exists ¹x such that Ã (x) = 1 for x > ¹x:
a university can set an admission test so tough that nobody can pass it.
With this assumption, it is also an innocuous normalisation to measure the
admission standard as the lowest ability which is necessary to match that
standard: Ã(x) ´ x. It is of course possible to add a stochastic component
to this relationship allowing students whose ability is below (above) x to be
admitted (rejected) with some probability; this would not alter the nature of
the interaction between universities.
If a student attends a university located in the town where she does
not live, she incurs a mobility cost. This is analogous to, but somewhat
more general than, the mobility cost in the location model in the horizontal
di¤erentiation literature, which measures the petrol cost of going to a shop
far away and the cost of the time spent travelling. In our model, to these costs
there should be added the inconvenience of being away from one’s home (and
therefore missing parents, friends and so on), the additional cost incurred in
renting a room, and so on.
If a student attends university, she receives a bene…t summarised in a
payo¤ function which depends on her own ability, µ, the admission threshold
of the university she attended as a student, x, and the mobility cost T :
U (x;µ) ¡ T; (2)
where Ux (x; µ) ; Uµ (x; µ) > 0, and T 2 f0; tg, with T = 0 if the student
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attends university in her home town, T = t > 0 otherwise.9
The function (2) is the reduced form of some underlying process. A way,
by no means unique, to obtain (2) is the following. Let the realisation of
labour market earnings, w, be distributed in IR+ according to a function
G (wj¢), so that G (wj¢) is the probability that the student’s (present dis-
counted value of future) labour market income is below w. Suppose that
the shape of G (wj¢) depends on the two parameters, µ and x, and naturally,
that µ1 > µ2 implies that G (wjµ1; x) …rst order stochastically dominates
G (wjµ2; x) for every x, and, conversely, that x1 > x2 implies that G (wjµ;x1)
…rst order stochastically dominates G (wjµ; x2) for every µ. In words, given
the quality of the university she attends a more able student is more likely to
receive a higher wage than a less able student, and, a given student is more
likely to receive a higher wage if she attends a university with a higher stan-
dard. Suppose also that the probability of a student obtaining a degree once
admitted be an increasing function of her ability ³ (µ). Then, if a student
maximises her expected utility, and has a von-Neumann-Morgerstern utility
function with argument the present discounted value of future labour market
u (w), the …rst term in (2) would be given by
U (x; µ) = ³ (µ)
Z
w2IR+
u (w) dG (wjµ; x) + (1 ¡ ³ (µ))
Z
w2IR+
u (w) dN (wjµ;x) :
In the above expression N (wjµ;x) is the distributions of the future earnings
of a student whose ability is µ 2 IR who attends an institution where the
admission threshold is x, but is not awarded a degree. It is immediate to
show that, if obtaining a degree increases one’s earnings, that is, if G (wjµ;x)
…rst order stochastically dominates N (wjµ;x), as seems natural, then the
assumed signs for the partial derivatives, Ux (x; µ) ;Uµ (x; µ) > 0, obtain.10
9Del Rey’s model (2000) di¤ers from ours in that a student’s demand for education
at each of the two universities is independent of her own ability: students only take into
account mobility costs and the quality of education. Consequently the payo¤ of a university
is independent of the quality of the students it attracts.
10In this example, we could allow for the probability of a student obtaining a degree
³(µ), to depend also on the admission threshold level x, which could be due to the fact
that a tougher admission test makes a student of a given ability “closer” to the lowest
ability of the students admitted.
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That ability should in‡uence positively future wages is tautological. It is
also reasonable to assume Ux(¢) > 0: it may be that a stricter admission test
at an institution reduces the number of graduates from that institution, and
therefore increase their rent in the labour market, or that it improves the
reputation of the graduates of the institution. It may also be the case that
a higher average ability of the students makes university attendance more
productive, for example, via a peer group e¤ect or because it allows more
advanced teaching.
Assumption 1 Uxµ (x;µ) > 0.
The bene…t of an increase in the admission threshold is higher for brighter
students. To the extent that x is positively correlated with the quality of
teaching it implies that brighter students bene…t more from higher quality
teaching sta¤ (it may also capture the idea that brighter students, ceteris
paribus, need to exert less e¤ort to be successful in their studies). Conse-
quently, a student’s net bene…ts from more restrictive admission requirements
and/or tougher exams increase with her ability.
We assume that a student who does not attend university has a reser-
vation utility normalised to U (0;0). Therefore, a student living in town i
would surely attend the university in town i if she is admitted; if she is not
admitted, she would travel to town j if and only if U (xj ; µ) > t.
While the following is an almost immediate consequence of Assumption
1, it is worth stating formally, since it facilitates the analysis of the rest of
the paper considerably.
Proposition 1 Let university j set standard xj, j = A;B. Let xA > xB.
(a) Let student of ability ~µk living in town k attend university A. Then
all students of ability µ > ~µk living in town k also attend university A.
(b) Let student of ability µk living in town k attend university B. Then
all students of ability µ > µk living in town k attend either university A or
university B, and all students of ability µ 6 µk living in town k either attend
university B or do not attend university.
(c) Let the student of ability µ^k living in town k not attend university.
Then all students of ability µ 6 µ^k living in town k do not attend university
either.
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Figure 1: Students’ attendance to universities
This follows from the fact that, given the mobility costs, a student of
higher ability gains more from attendance to a university with a stricter
admission test. An analogue of this is established in Epple and Romano
(1998). The proposition implies a straightforward strati…cation by ability:
within each town, the ablest student go to the best university. Of course it
may happen that it is not the case that in a given town there are students
attending both universities.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition and shows the marginal values of
µ^k ; µk and eµk for which statements (a), (b) and (c) in Proposition 1 hold.
The horizontal axis measures students ability. Students whose ability and
location is along the dashed (dotted) line go to university A (B). Note that
the lowest ~µB could be as high as 1, in which case no student from town B
goes to university A, and that the lowest µ^A could be as high as the lowest
¹µA, in which case no student from town A goes to university B.
3 Equilibria
The assumptions of the previous two subsections allow us to simplify con-
siderably the interaction between universities and between universities and
students. We can set up a conceptually simple two-person normal form game
with universities A and B as the players and with their strategy space given
by the admission standards, xA 2 X , xB 2 X. The payo¤ functions of the
two universities are given by:
¼j (xA; xB) = W (nj (xA; xB) ; b¡ c (nj (xA; xB)) ;£j (xA; xB)) ; j = A;B;
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where nj (xA ; xB) and £j (xA ; xB ) are the number of students admitted to
university j, and the average quality of the students at university j (j =
A;B), respectively, given the admission standards xA and xB. We do not
determine the exact shape of the functions nj and £j. It is, however,
straightforward to establish that @£j=@xj > 0: an increase in a univer-
sity’s admission standards increases the average ability of that university’s
students. This is obviously plausible. Finally, notice that we have subsituted
for R = b¡ c (nj (xA ; xB)) ; where b > 0 is the university budget.
A convenient benchmark case is obtained when universities are monop-
olies. We can think of two cases: a university can be a monopoly in the
whole sector, for example because it is the only university allowed, or it can
be a monopolist in its own town, for example because the students do not
travel.In the …rst case, if t = 0, the number of students it admits if it sets
a standard x is 2 (1 ¡ F (x)), in the second it is (1 ¡ F (x)). The …rst order
conditions for the two cases are
2 (Wn (¢) ¡WR (¢) c0 (¢)) f (x) = W£ (¢)£x (¢) ; (4)
(Wn (¢) ¡WR (¢) c0 (¢)) f (x) = W£ (¢)£x (¢) : (5)
The de…nition of the function £ is analogous to that given above for the
case where two universities compete. We may denote by xM and xm the
solution to the above expressions; and note that the assumption that the
cross derivatives are su¢ciently small ensures that the relevant second order
conditions identify xM and xm as the unique maxima for the problems.
In general the relationship between xM and xm is ambiguous. Consider
the optimum choice of x when the distribution of students is given by ®F (µ)
(xM and xm are the optima for ® = 2 and ® = 1, respectively). Total
di¤erentiation of the …rst order conditions (leaving out the cross derivatives)
gives:
dx
d®
=
[Wn(¢)¡WR(¢)c0(¢)]f(µ)+
h
Wnn(¢)¡WRR(¢)c0(¢)¡WR(¢)c00(¢)
i
®f(µ)(1¡F(µ))
d2W=dx2
this would be negative ifW and c (¢) were linear (Wnn (¢) = WRR (¢) = c00 (¢) =
0). Figure 2 depicts the indi¤erence map in the (x; n) plane (using the
constraint given by research): the budget set is given by the curves 1¡F (x)
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Figure 2: The standard chosen by a monopolist
and 2 (1 ¡ F (x)) for the two cases. In the picture xM > xm , although it
should be obvious that the opposite relationship could well hold. Intuitively,
when the population increases the same reduction in the admission threshold
is compensated for by a larger increase in the number of students. If Wn (¢),
WR (¢) and c0(¢) are approximately constant, then the cost reduction of this
increase in the number of students is approximately constant, but the bene…t
increases as the population increases. Vice versa, when W is concave, the
bene…t of an increase in students number is lower, and the cost in reduced
research expenditure is higher, for a large university.
We can now begin the analysis of competition between universities. Our
…rst result may appear surprising.
Proposition 2 A symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only
if t > U (xm ; xm).
Proof. At a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, it must be the case
that xA = xB = xm: any value of common threshold xA = xB di¤erent
from xm necessarily violates the …rst order condition (5). Notice moreover,
that, when t is high enough, xA = xB = xm does indeed identify a Nash
equilibrium, in view of the de…nition of xm and of the assumptions we made
on the second derivatives of the function W .
Now suppose, by contradiction, that there is in fact a symmetric equilib-
rium with t < U (xm; xm). We now show that one university, say B, has an
11
incentive to deviate from fxm; xmg. Let ±L be such that
U (xm ¡ ±L; 1) = U (xm; 1) ¡ t
That is, if a university, say university A, reduces its standard by ±L, it
makes the brightest student living in town A indi¤erent between attending
university A and travelling to B. Clearly ±L > 0, and by Assumption 1,
U (xm ¡ ±L; µ) > U (xm ; µ) ¡ t for every µ 2 [xm ;1). Now let university B
choose xm ¡ ", for some " 2 (0; ±L). Its change in payo¤ is approximated by:
¡"£
Ã
(Wn (¢) ¡WR (¢) c0 (¢)) @nB (xm ; xm)@xB
¯¯¯¯
xB<xm
+W£ (¢)£x (¢)
!
(7)
where
@nB (xm ; xm)
@xB
¯¯¯¯
xB<xm
= lim
h!0¡
nB (xm; xm + h) ¡ nB (xm ; xm)
h
is the left partial derivative of nB (xm; xm)Note that, for xB < xm, nB (xm; xB) =
1 ¡ F (xm) + 2 (F (xm) ¡ F (xB )) and, therefore
@nB (xm; xm)
@xB
¯¯¯¯
xB<xm
= lim
h!0¡
2 (F (xm) ¡ F (xm + h))
h
= ¡2f (xm)
and (7) becomes:
¡"£ (¡2 (Wn (¢) ¡WR (¢)c0 (¢))f (xm) +W£ (¢)£x (¢))
using (5) this is:
"W£ (¢)£x (¢) > 0
Therefore a small reduction from xm increases university B’s payo¤; this
establishes the Proposition.
On the other hand, if t > U (xm; xm), then this deviation is not possible,
because, if a student of ability below xm travelled to the other town to attend
university, she would get a negative utility.
The argument underlying the proof of the Proposition may be described
informally as follows. If xA = xB and xA, say, is increased marginally,
then the objective function for university A is the same as when there is
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local monopoly since no one would travel to town A: This implies that if
xA = xB < xm we are not at an equilibrium. Moreover, if xA = xB and
again xA is decreased marginally, then either there is no travel to town A
(t > U (xA ; xB)), or there is some travel to town A by those who now have
the opportunity to go to a university (t < U (xA ; xB)). In the former case,
if initially xA = xB < xm; then one can check that university A’s payo¤
rises more rapidly as xA is decreased marginally than under local monopoly.
Hence, xA = xB = xm is necessary for a symmetric equilibrium.11 However,
a symmetric equilibrium does not exists for low mobility costs. This is be-
cause of the asymmetric e¤ect of a small reduction and a small increase in
a university’s choice of x. The reasoning is as follows. When xA = xB, all
students located in town k = A;B with ability µ > xA go to the university
in their home town; while all students with ability µ < xA do not attend
university. Local optimality implies that the bene…cial e¤ects of an increase
in x by " > 0 (given by the improvement in the quality threshold) are ex-
actly compensated by its negative e¤ect of the reduction in size (dampened
by the resources freed for research). However, when the admission threshold
is lowered by ", it is possible to obtain an increase in the number of students
whose positive e¤ects have the same absolute value as an increase by 2".
Mixed strategy equilibria, in the present situation, lack appeal; we there-
fore prefer to investigate whether asymmetric pure strategy equilibria exist.
For the sake of de…niteness, we consider the case xA > xB (so that A and B
are mnemonics for ‘Alto’ (high) and ‘Basso’ (low)). Clearly, if fxA; xBg is an
equilibrium, then the mirror strategy pair fxB; xAg is too.
An important concept in the rest of the paper is the function eµ (xA; xB; t),
which is the ability level such that the student with that ability who lives
in town B (the low admission university) is indi¤erent between going to her
local university and travelling to town A, where she incurs travel cost t, but
can expect higher future labour market income. eµ (xA; xB; t) is therefore the
solution in µ of
U (xA ; µ) ¡ t = U (xB; µ) ; (8)
if there is a solution to (8) in (xA ;1). If there is no such solution, then
11We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this argument.
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eµ (xA ; xB; t) is the appropriate extreme of the interval (xA; 1): eµ (xA; xB; t) =
1 if t > U (xA; 1) ¡ U (xB; 1), and eµ (xA ; xB ; t) = xA if t < U (xA ; xA) ¡
U (xB; xA). Note that, by Assumption 1, there is at most one value of µ
which satis…es (8). Moreover, denote by bµ (xB; t) the ability level such that
the student with that ability who lives in town A is indi¤erent between
travelling to town B and not attending the university. Then, bµ (xB; t) is the
solution of
U (xB; µ) ¡ t = U (0;0) (9)
if there exists µ 2 [xB; xA] satisfying the above. Otherwise, if the solution
to (9) is such that µ < xB then bµ (xB; t) = xB, and if the solution to (9) is
such that µ > xA, then the µ (xB ; t) = xA, and no student from university A
attends the university in town B.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 and of the de…nitions ofeµ (xA ; xB; t) and bµ (xB; t) is the following.
Corollary 1 At any equilibrium where xA > xB: students from town A
attend university A if µ 2 [xA; 1] and university B if µ 2
hbµ(xB; t); xA .´ Stu-
dents from town B attend university A if µ 2
heµ (xA ; xB ; t) ; 1i and university
B if and only if µ 2
h
xB;eµ (xA ; xB; t)´.
The next Proposition is the main result of this section. It characterises
how the equilibrium con…guration changes as the mobility cost changes. This
is important: casual empiricism suggests that the parameter t varies consid-
erably from country to country; moreover, education policies targeted to the
university sector are likely to a¤ect this parameter, perhaps even uninten-
tionally.
Proposition 3 There exist t1 < U (xm ; xm), such that:
For t 2 [0; t1) there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
For t 2 [t1; U (xm; xm)] there are, at most, asymmetric pure strategy equi-
libria.
For t > U (xm; xm) the pure strategy equilibrium is symmetric, with xA =
xB = xm.
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Proof. The third statement has been proved in Proposition 2, and the
second follows trivially from it. Consider the …rst statement. We show that
there is no pure strategy equilibrium for t = 0, using an argument which can
be extended by continuity to a (su¢ciently) small t > 0. By contradiction,
let fxA ; xBg with xA > xB be a Nash equilibrium when t = 0. In this case
all students with µ 2 [xB; xA) attend university in town B, and all students
with µ > xA attend university in town A. Note that the payo¤ of university
B must be at least as big as university A’s:
¼B (xA; xB) > ¼A (xA; xB) : (10)
The reason is that, otherwise, university B could deviate to xA + ", take
(almost) all the students from university A, and therefore improve its pay-
o¤. Notice also that µ^ (xB; t) = xB < 1, because of t = 0. Now let ~x be
given by: 1 ¡ F (~x) = F (xA) ¡ F (xB): ~x is such that there are, overall,
2 (F (xA) ¡ F (xB)) students of ability ~x or higher. Clearly if university A
chose ~x, it would have the same number of students as university B has at
the candidate equilibrium, and therefore the same research expenditure as
university B at this candidate equilibrium. However, since ~x > xB it would
have a bigger payo¤:
¼A (~x;xB) > ¼B (xA ; xB ) (11)
(10) and (11) together imply ¼A (~x; xB) > ¼A (xA; xB) but this in turn implies
that xA cannot be university A’s maximizing choice. This establishes the …rst
statement.
4 An example
In this section we specify the functional relationships of the model in order
to show that asymmetric equilibria do in fact exist for plausible and robust
functional forms and parameter sets. We modify the model as may be nec-
essary to achieve explicit and not too cumbersome solutions (and therefore
some of the results obtained in the general set-up considered above may not
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hold). Speci…cally, we assume the following
U (x; µ) = wx+ µ (12)
W (n; R;£) = wxn+ R (13)
c (n) = cn2 (14)
F (µ) = µ (15)
Note that (12) implies Uxµ = 0 against Assumption 1. This simpli…es
the analysis, without altering the qualitative features of the solution. (14)
and (13) are speci…c functions which allow the determination of an explicit
solution. According to (13), a university’s payo¤ is an increasing function of
the number of graduates, n, and of its own admission standard, as well as
the amount spent on research. This simplify the analysis, and is justi…ed on
the ground that an increase in the admission standard increases the average
ability of its graduates. Finally, (15) says that the distribution of abilities is
uniform.
Since our aim is to show that asymmetric equilibria exist, we further
simplify the model by assuming that the utility from obtaining a university
degree is always greater than any mobility costs the student might have to
incur in order to attend the university. That is, for every x; µ 2 (0; 1]
U (x; µ) ¡ t > U (0; 0)
Hence U has a discontinuity at (0; 0), with a jump greater than t. Given
the normalisation Ã(x) = x; this implies that bµB = bµA = xB: students from
both towns with ability at least xB will be admitted to university and will
be willing to attend.12
Towards the analysis of the equilibrium, note that students in town A
attend university A, if their ability is at least xA, and university B, if their
ability is less than xA, but at least xB . Students in town B, on the other
hand, attend university B, if their ability is less than xA, but at least xB ;
12This assumption is made for simplicity and implies the non-existence of symmetric
equilibria. It is therefore a special case of the result in Proposition 2, which holds because
of U (xm; xm) ¡ t > U (0; 0) for all t:
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Figure 3: Equilibria in the parameter space
and if their ability is xA or above, attend university A if xA ¡ xB 6 t=w;
university B in the opposite case.
Note that the parameter space (t; w; c) can be simpli…ed by de…ning g = wc
so that the equilibrium can be fully characterised in a Cartesian diagram¡ t
w ;
w
c
¢
. This we do in …gure 3. In the diagram, the lines are given by:
f1 =
g
³
g+4+2
p
2g(g+1)
´
8(g+2)(g+1) , f2 =
g
³
g+4¡
p
g(5g+16)
´
8(g+2)2 , f3 =
g
p
g(3g+8)
4(g+2)2 .
These lines identify a number of regions and the following proposition
describes the nature of the equilibrium in each of them.
Proposition 4 In the white areas in the …gure, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium. In the remaining areas there exists an asymmetric equilibrium.
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In the areas labelled I, university A and B choose respectively
xA =
g + 2
2 (g + 1)
= xm (16)
xB =
(4 + 3g) (g + 4)
8 (g + 1) (g + 2)
(17)
In the areas labelled II
xA =
g + 4
2 (g + 2)
= xM (18)
xB =
(g + 4)2
4 (g + 2)2
(19)
The proof of this result is analytically very cumbersome, and is relegated
to an appendix available on request from the authors or from http://www-
users.york.ac.uk/~gd4/elite.htm. Note also that area I extends beyond
the boundary of the drawing.
However, a verbose description of the two type of equilibria can be given
relatively straightforwardly: when the parameter combination is represented
by a point in area labelled I, students’ attendance to universities is described
in Figure 4: students who can be admitted to university A go there only if
they live in town A; all other students, of ability xB or above go to university
B. The admission standard set by university B is su¢ciently close (relative
to the mobility cost) to make it impossible for university A to capture all the
high ability students: those living in town B go to town B. So university
A chooses the optimal location given distribution F (x), xm, determined in
(5). Consider now university B: could it pro…tably deviate from standard
xB? Suppose that university B lowers its standard so as to lose its high
quality students and gain more low quality students from both towns. Since
the higher the mobility costs the lower the level of xB that induces the high
quality students in town B to move to town A; it is clear that (given g)
for high mobility costs, this deviation is too expensive in terms of lost pres-
tige. A di¤erent type of deviation is a su¢ciently large increase in admission
standard, so as to leapfrog university A. This, again, will not be pro…table
if, given g; the mobility cost is high, since the higher the mobility cost the
higher the level of xB that is necessary to attract the high quality students
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and the lower the number of students. If a parameter combination is an equi-
librium of type I, then a su¢cient reduction in the mobility cost will destroy
it by making it pro…table for university B to deviate in one of the two ways
described above.
Consider now parameter combinations represented by points in the area
labelled II. Here, all the students who can attend the high quality university
go to university A: This situation is described in …gure 5, where, as before,
the dashed (dotted) line denotes students whose location and ability is such
that they attend university A (B). To understand why this constitutes an
equilibrium, note …rst of all that, given that university B has lower quality
than university A, the latter will choose the admission standard that an
“undisturbed” monopolist would choose, xM . Consider university B next. It
is at a local optimum: given that it cannot attract students of ability xA or
above, xB is the preferred standard. However, it could choose an admission
standard su¢ciently close to xA so that all the students living in town B
prefer to go to university B. This has the bene…t of attracting (1 ¡ F (xA))
students (the high ability students who attend university A in the candidate
equilibrium), but at the cost of losing low ability students from both towns,
who are no longer capable of passing the admission test. When the mobility
cost is low, in order to attract the high ability students, university B needs
to choose an admission standard quite close to university A, implying a high
cost of the deviation: thus an increase in the mobility cost would destroy
this equilibrium by allowing the university B to position its standard below
xA but su¢ciently close to attract the high ability students living in town A.
Instead of attracting only the high ability students in its own town, university
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B could deviate from the candidate equilibrium trying to attract all the
high ability students: it can do so by leapfrogging university A, choosing
an admission standard su¢ciently higher than xA. For this deviation to be
pro…table, it must be the case that the mobility cost is su¢ciently low that
university B’s deviation standard is close enough to xA (otherwise there are
not enough students in the two towns).13 To sum up, when an equilibrium in
area II exists, it is destroyed both by an increase in the mobility cost –which
makes a deviation to a standard below xA pro…table– and by a decrease in
the mobility cost –which makes a deviation to an admission standard above
xA pro…table.
Some further features of the above equilibria may be worth mentioning.
First, in the equilibrium in area I, the number of students at each of the
two universities is nA =
¡
1 ¡ xA¢ and nB = (1 ¡ 2xB + xA) and, therefore,
nB > nA: that is, university A is an élite institution: it has fewer students
and higher admission standards. Instead, in the equilibria in areas II the
number of students at each of the two universities is: nA = 2 (1 ¡ xA) and
nB = 2 (xA ¡ xB). A simple calculation shows that, in this case, nA > nB ;
this is be robust to change in the functional forms. It is also the case that,
in our example, the degree of di¤erentiation between the two universities
(as captured by the di¤erence between xA and xB) tends to increase with
the level of competition (as captured by a reduction in the mobility costs t
(relative to w)).
13This is the same type of deviation we discussed for the previous equilibrium. Notice
though that the mobility cost does not need to be as high as in the previous case since
the level of xA is lower.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we use a simple industrial organisation framework to analyse
the strategic interaction between two non-pro…t education institutions. They
compete by unilaterally choosing their own admissions standard, and each
aims to maximise prestige, which we let depend on the number of students
enrolled, their ability, and the success of its research.
We concentrate on the relationship between the equilibrium con…guration
and the mobility cost for students. When this cost is low, there is no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. When the cost is high there are pure strategy
equilibria; for intermediate values of the mobility cost, if equilibria exist,
then they are asymmetric. The example in Section 4 shows that asymmetric
equilibria do in fact exist for reasonable parameter combinations.
Throughout the paper we have restricted attention to the case where the
universities are allocated a …xed and identical budget from the government
and where tuition fees play no role in the determination of the allocation of
students between the institutions. Further research should extend the model
to the more general and realistic case where universities are also able to charge
a tuition fee to their students and the government optimally designs the
subsidy to be given to the universities, taking into account their interaction.
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